---
title: "Information, Uncertainty, & Public Support for Brinkmanship during the 2023 Debt Limit Negotiations"
authors: ["Matthew DiGiuseppe", "Patrick E. Shea"]
year: 2025
status: "Published"
venue: "British Journal of Political Science, 55, e14"
topics: ["Political Economy & Sovereign Debt"]
doi: "10.1017/s0007123424000462"
url: "https://www.matthewdigiuseppe.com/papers/information-uncertainty-public-support-brinkmanship.md"
links: {"Link": "https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/information-uncertainty-and-public-support-for-brinkmanship-during-the-2023-debt-limit-negotiations/21F8732E235423CD2CD879B2BC266306"}
full_text: false
---

# Information, Uncertainty, & Public Support for Brinkmanship during the 2023 Debt Limit Negotiations

DiGiuseppe, M., & Shea, P.E. (2025). Information, Uncertainty, & Public Support for Brinkmanship during the 2023 Debt Limit Negotiations. British Journal of Political Science, 55, e14.

- Status: Published
- Topics: Political Economy & Sovereign Debt
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123424000462
- Link: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/information-uncertainty-and-public-support-for-brinkmanship-during-the-2023-debt-limit-negotiations/21F8732E235423CD2CD879B2BC266306
- Listed on: https://www.matthewdigiuseppe.com/#research

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## Abstract

Why do US voters allow politicians to hold the country’s economy hostage during debt ceiling negotiations? In this research note, we argue that ignorance and uncertainty over the consequences of a debt ceiling breach play a nontrivial role in public support for hard-line negotiating positions. In a pre-registered survey experiment, two weeks before the June 2023 deadline to raise the US debt ceiling, we show that providing credible information about the consequences of default increases support for concessions among both Democrats and Republicans. Further, more certain information about the consequences of a debt ceiling breach has a larger effect than less-certain information suggesting that the unpredictable consequences of the crisis also help explain voter reluctance to accept concessions. The findings have implications for understanding debt ceiling negotiations and other crisis bargaining situations where the public serves as a relevant third party.